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Transnational Fiduciary Law in Financial Intermediation: 
Are We There Yet? 
A Case Study in the Emergence of Transnational Legal 
Ordering 
Jens-Hinrich Binder* 
 
At first sight, the emergence of globally accepted conduct-of-business standards for securi-
ties intermediaries, driven by international standard-setting bodies, presents itself as a showcase 
for successful transnational legal ordering. For some time now, such standards have come to ad-
dress issues that traditionally would be addressed by fiduciary law in common law jurisdictions. 
Within the European Union, the relevant standards have been transposed into legislation bind-
ing on all EU Member States, irrespective of their legal environment. While clearly originating 
from common law principles governing fiduciary relationships, the standards thus have trickled 
into civil law systems, turning them into a useful object of study from the perspective of transna-
tional law theory. Against this backdrop, the present Article explores the emanation, develop-
ment, transnational dissemination, and reception of conduct-of-business standards from a Euro-
pean and German law perspective and looks at enforcement problems in both administrative and 
contract law. It demonstrates that, while the relevant law can be characterized as reflecting an 
emerging transnational legal order, differences between legal systems continue to exist and the pro-
cess of transnationalization is far from over. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In both common and civil law jurisdictions, fiduciary duties, in the broad-
est sense, have long been recognized as a key element of the relationships be-
tween financial intermediaries and their customers. If one defines fiduciary rela-
tionships as including “important social and economic interactions of high trust 
and confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar vulnerability of 
the beneficiary to the fiduciary,” to borrow a definition suggested by Leonard 
Rotman,1 a broad range of financial services clearly match the description.2 From 
a comparative––and, particularly, from a Trans-Atlantic perspective––a useful 
starting point for the analysis can be found in the statutory definitions of financial 
activities subject to specific prudential and conduct-of-business regulations. 
Wherever intermediaries hold money or other assets on behalf of clients in con-
nection with transactions carried out on their behalf3 or agree to provide expert 
advice with regard to investments4 or the conditions of a loan taken out by a cus-
tomer,5 the existence of both a high level of trust and a high level of dependency 
and vulnerability on the part of the client is not just a characteristic feature of the 
intermediary-customer relationship, but provides the very rationale for public in-
tervention, particularly in the form of conduct-of-business regulation. From a 
common law perspective, such activities will usually be qualified as agency rela-
 
1       Leonard I. Rotman, Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciarity, 62 MCGILL L.J. 
975, 988 (2017). 
2       It should be noted that this definition, although firmly rooted in common law doctrine, is 
generic in nature. At least English cases traditionally have determined the existence of fiduciary 
duties by reference to the status of the relevant relationships (trustee-beneficiary, solicitor client, 
agent-principal, director-company, partner-partner), while only a smaller number of cases have 
adopted a functional definition, see, within the present context, The Law Commission, Fiduciary 
Duties and Regulatory Rules, Consultation Paper No. 124, (London: HMSO 1992) ¶¶ 2.4.3-2.4.7. 
For an example of the latter, which is broadly consistent with the definition advanced above, see, 
e.g., Reading v. Attorney-General [1949] 2 K.B. 232, 236, approved on appeal [1951] A.C. 507 (di 
cussed in Law Commission, ibid., para. 2.4.5):  
 
(“[T]he term ‘fiduciary relation’ . . . is used in a very loose, or at all events a very compre-
hensive, sense . . . [F]or the present purpose a ‘fiduciary relation’ exists (a) whenever the 
plaintiff entrusts to the defendant property . . . and (b) whenever the plaintiff entrusts to 
the defendant a job to be performed . . . and relies on the defendant to procure for the 
plaintiff the best terms available. . .”). 
 
3      Qualifying as an “ancillary service” in relation to the provision of “investment services.” Eu-
ropean Parliament Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L173) 349, 481 [hereinafter MiFID II]. In U.S. 
law, by contrast, the Securities Exchange Act applies a rather broad concept to define a “broker” 
as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions for the account of others.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012).  
4     Qualifying as an “investment service” pursuant to MiFID II Annex I, Section A no. (5) in 
conjunction with Art. 4(1)(2). In U.S. law, the provision of investment advisers is addressed by the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-20 (2019). 
5       Unlike investment advice, the provision of advice with regard to the conditions (and/or uses) 
of a loan to a borrower is not universally regulated as a financial service and thus does not give 
rise to specific regulatory duties on the part of an intermediary, but may nonetheless held to be 
subject to special duties of care under fiduciary law or general principles of contract law. Cf., e.g., 
Andrew F. Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in Banking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 
ch. 7, at 128 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff, eds., 2019) (discussing U.S. case 
law); Jens-Hinrich Binder, Germany, in A BANK’S DUTY OF CARE 61, at 63–65 (Danny Busch & 
Cees Van Dam, eds., 2017) (discussing the legal basis in German law and relevant cases). 
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tionships, which, given the functional nexus between fiduciary law and the law of 
agency in common law generally,6 helps explain why financial intermediaries have 
frequently been held to be under fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, as well as du-
ties to disclose certain information, to their customers.7 This analysis can be 
backed up by an economic analysis of the agency problems between the interme-
diary (acting as “agent” for less knowledgeable investors) and the customer (as a 
“principal,” who, almost by definition, can hardly protect himself against the fall-
out from information asymmetries and conflicts of interest on the part of the 
former).8 However, even in civil law jurisdictions, where the legal basis for finan-
cial services contracts usually consists of, or is derived from, statutory categories 
of general contract law,9 the concept of fiduciary duties has increasingly come to 
be accepted as an analytical framework.10 For a number of reasons to be explored 
in more detail below, both the substantive laws pertaining to the provision of fi-
nancial services and, indeed, their doctrinal interpretation can be seen to have 
converged in a large number of jurisdictions over the last few decades. 
With international standard setters, in particular the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), as a driving force behind these de-
velopments,11 the emergence of an increasing body of internationally agreed set of 
standards applicable to intermediary-customer relationships in financial services 
appears to represent a showcase for transnational legal ordering, in terms of the 
causes of convergence, the underlying institutional arrangements that facilitate the 
transmission process, as well as the substance of such duties and their adaptation 
in different legal systems. On closer inspection, however, the picture is more nu-
anced. As rightly observed in a recent contribution by Howell Jackson and Talia 
Gillis, we have to distinguish between the regulatory regimes applicable to the 
provision of financial services, “elaborate set[s] of ex ante requirements[,] and sup-
plemental open-ended duties that govern the operations of regulated entities and 
police their interactions with the public,” on the one hand, and parallel, overlap-
ping, or indeed conflicting fiduciary duties proper, which are derived from general 
principles of private law and imposed ex post by courts in individual law suits.12 As 
 
6      E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 23 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). See also Howell E. Jackson & Talia B. Gillis, 
Fiduciary Law and Financial Regulation, supra at 856. Cf., Marme Inversiones 2007 SL v. NatWest 
Markets PLC and Others [2019] EWHC 366 (Comm) (QB) 408–17, for an in-depth analysis of the 
doctrinal link between the two concepts from an English law perspective. 
7      See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 632–39 (7th ed. 2017); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1279–83 
(1983); cf., Tuch, supra note 5 (comprehensively analysing U.S. case law in relation to commercial 
and investment banking activities); Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Principles in Investment Advice, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, ch. 8 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (comprehen-
sively analysing U.S. Case law in relation to the provision of investment advice). English courts 
have also recognized the fiduciary nature of broker services, cf., e.g., Brandeis (Brokers) Ltd v Her-
bert Black 2001 WL 513189 (QB), paras. 49, 52. 
8      See also Langevoort, supra note 7, at 1249–50, 1252–58 (discussing the economic aspects of se-
curities frauds in the light of the principal-agent relationship between broker and investor); cf. D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1432 (2002) 
(noting the applicability and limits of the principal-agent theory in relation to fiduciary relation-
ships). 
9      Cf., e.g., the position of German law infra Section III.C. 
10    See Binder, supra note 5 (combining both civil and common law analyses of various types of 
commercial and investment banking activities); see also Thilo Kuntz, Das Recht der Interessenwahrung 
Verhältnisse und Perspektiven von Fiduciary Law in Deutschland, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARSTEN 
SCHMIDT ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 761, 773–80 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2019) (Ger.), for 
an analysis of the relevance of fiduciary duties in the areas of investment advice and corporate law. 
11     See infra Section III.C. 
12    See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 851, 853, for early, but very comprehensive analyses of 
the interplay between both regimes (from an English law perspective). Compare The Law Commis-
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will be discussed below, while the structure and content of regulatory regimes have 
been converging over the past decades, the relevant fiduciary principles, in terms of 
substance, interpretation, and, indeed, their functions within the respective private 
law regimes, continue to vary among different jurisdictions. This is certainly true 
within the European Union, where EU law has gone some way to harmonize the 
regulatory framework, whereas the applicable private law remains to be defined 
by the laws of the Member States, many of which had established transactions-
oriented principles long before the first harmonization efforts at the European 
level.13 However, in addition to the international harmonization of regulatory 
conduct-of-business standards, their interaction with the applicable private law 
regimes can also be identified as a common theme: whether, and to what extent, 
principles of general contract law are influenced by regulatory requirements and 
which of the two regimes prevails in cases of conflicting duties. Such questions 
will ultimately influence which duties can be enforced by customers in private 
lawsuits against the intermediary. The answers may differ from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction, depending on the doctrinal basis. Yet the very fact that regulatory re-
quirements and duties under general contract law coexist and that the potential 
for tensions between the two regimes clearly is a recurring phenomenon provides 
sufficient grounds for the hypothesis that, in the end, fiduciary activities by finan-
cial intermediaries are the object of an emerging transnational legal order. 
Focusing on conduct-of-business standards for securities services provid-
ers,14 the present Article explores the emergence of a transnational body of fiduci-
ary duties of financial intermediaries. Section II below examines the interaction 
between regulatory requirements and fiduciary principles and explains the trans-
national character of the former. Section III then looks into the process of how 
transnational regulatory principles have been adapted by European legislation, 
which in turn has also triggered a process of convergence of the underlying con-
tract law regimes. In this process, it will be argued, substantive and organizational 
duties of care and loyalty have changed their nature: principles derived from the 
common law doctrine of fiduciary law are adapted to different contract law re-
gimes, while retaining their functions and meaning for the individual customer. As 
demonstrated by ongoing disputes concerning the relevance of regulatory duties 
for individual contractual relationships in several European jurisdictions, this pro-
cess is by no means frictionless––but it is, for that very reason, an interesting case 
study in the emergence of a transnational legal order. Section IV concludes.  
 
II. FIDUCIARY LAW IN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: 
A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER?!  
A. Conduct-of-business standards as transnational law: origins, nature, and legitimacy 
The modern development towards converging conduct-of-business stand-
ards for the provision of financial services (and, thus, towards standards for the 
regulatory treatment of relationships that qualify as “fiduciary” within the meaning 
 
sion, supra note 2 with THE LAW COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, 
1995 Law Com. No. 236 (UK). 
13      Infra Section III.C. 
14     To be sure, similar observations can be made also in other areas of financial intermediation. 
Arguably, though, securities intermediation is a particularly well-placed object of study for present 
purposes, given the high degree of convergence of applicable conduct-of-business standards in 
this regard, especially by comparison with retail banking activities the regulation of which, at least 
in the EU, has not attracted the attention of the legislator to a similar extent. 
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defined above) can be traced back, at least, to the late 1980s and early 1990s.15 
Following preparatory work, in particular, by the French Commission des Opé-
rations de Bourse (COB), which had published a report of self-regulatory princi-
ples for the provision of securities services in 1988,16 the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) promulgated a set of genuinely interna-
tional, rather high-level and basic, conduct-of-business standards, entitled “Inter-
national Conduct of Business Principles,”17 in July 1990.18 With this “soft law” 
document, IOSCO made a first step towards the global recognition of conduct-
of-business regulation as an integral part of securities regulation generally, imple-
mented and enforced in the interest of customer protection and market integrity 
and distinct from market conduct regulation (e.g., relating to insider trading and 
market abuse) on the one hand and the prudential regulation of intermediaries’ 
capital and liquidity positions on the other hand.19 The need for global conver-
gence of such standards, in the report, is justified against the backdrop of the in-
ternationalization of securities markets since the 1970s, driven by technological 
progress but also the institutionalization of portfolio management in the widest 
sense, whereby not just issuers’ and intermediaries’, but also investors’ activities 
extended increasingly beyond national boundaries.20 Significantly, in this context, 
global harmonization of conduct-of-business standards is argued to be in the in-
terest of market participants themselves, as universally applicable common prin-
ciples “should facilitate cross border business, encouraging competition among 
firms, with increased customer choice and lower costs. Commonly agreed princi-
ples should also enhance investor understanding, and hence confidence, thereby 
increasing investor participation in international markets.”21 Conduct-of-business 
principles, in the report, were defined “as those principles of conduct which gov-
ern the activities of those who provide financial services and which have the ob-
jective of protecting the interests of their customers and the integrity of the mar-
ket.”22 
To that end, the “principles” established, in particular, the following duties 
of an investment firm:23 
- to “act honestly and fairly in the best interest of its customers and the integri-
ty of the market” (which expressly included “any obligation to avoid mislead-
ing and deceptive acts or representations”); 
- to “act with due skill, care and diligence in the best interest of its customers 
and the integrity of the market” (which expressly included “any duty of best 
execution”); 
- to provide for and effectively employ the necessary resources; 
 
15    It is, therefore, imprecise to attribute IOSCO’s work only to a later stage of international 
standard setting in financial regulation, but see Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence 
and Limits of the Transnational Financial Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 231, at 238 
(Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 2015) (referring to later work products). 
16     Cf. Commission des Opérations de Bourse (C.O.B.), Rapport Général du Groupe de Déon-
tologie des Activités Financières (C.O.B. Supplément au Bulletin Mensuel no. 212, mars 1988), 
https://www.amf-france.org/technique/multimedia?docId=workspace://SpacesStore/e253b577-
a2a5-47f3-9768-e66c72d59514_fr_1.0_rendition. 
17     The Technical Committee of the Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], International 
Conduct of Business Principles (July 9, 1990), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCO 
PD8.pdf  [hereinafter The Technical Committee of IOSCO]. 
18     Cf., e.g., Dirk Hermann Bliesener, Aufsichtsrechtliche Verhaltenspflichten beim Wertpapierhandel, 205–
6 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998) (discussing the developments leading towards this report) (Ger.). 
19     The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, paras. 18–21. 
20     Id. paras. 4–7. 
21     Id. para. 12. 
22     Id. at 7. 
23     Id. at 8–9. 
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- to “seek from its customers information about their financial situation, in-
vestment experience and investment objectives relevant to the services to be 
provided” (to “know one’s customer”); 
- to “make adequate disclosure of relevant material information in its dealings 
with its customers” (in order to provide the customer with all relevant infor-
mation needed to make informed investment decisions and in order to keep 
her informed as to the execution of orders); and 
- to “try to avoid conflicts of interest, and when they cannot be avoided, [to] 
ensure that its customers are fairly treated.” 
 
These principles were later taken up, and refined further, by the IOSCO 
“Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation,” first promulgated in Sep-
tember 1998,24 the last comprehensive update of which was published in 2003.25 
To be sure, conduct-of-business standards as part of regulatory (as distinct 
from contract law) frameworks for the provision of investment services are con-
siderably older than these international standards. Within the United States, they 
were first introduced by federal securities legislation in the 1930s and 1940s, most 
notably the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 and the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940,27 which, in conjunction with SEC Rules adopted under the Securities Ex-
change Act, prescribed a number of transaction-oriented standards for the provi-
sion of investment services (in a wide, non-technical sense).28  
Given not just the global importance of the City of London, but also, at 
the time, the United Kingdom’s considerable influence on the content of Europe-
an legislation, the comprehensive reform of the regulatory framework for finan-
cial services undertaken by the British legislator in the 1980s can be identified as 
yet another important milestone in the process of global convergence of such 
standards. Replacing the former, exclusively self-regulatory arrangements with an 
integrated system of self-regulatory bodies and oversight by a public authority, 
Part I, Chapter V of UK Financial Services Act of 1986 (1986 c. 60) established 
the statutory basis for a complex set of conduct-of-business requirements that 
had to be developed by the Financial Services Authority (formerly, the “Securities 
and Investments Board”) and a number of recognized (sector-specific) self-
regulatory organizations (SROs).29 
Within the European Economic Community (as it then was), Article 11 of 
the Investment Services Directive (ISD) of 199330 first established an obligation 
for Member States to introduce a range of harmonized, yet rather broadly defined 
conduct-of-business standards for the provision of investment and related ser-
vices. Significantly, the requirements, to a large extent, were a verbatim adaptation 
 
24     Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at 
33–41, (Sept. 1998) https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf. 
25     Int’l Org. of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at 
32–39, (May 2003), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf. 
26      See MiFID II, supra note 3. 
27      See supra note 4. 
28     See generally, for example, HAZEN, supra note 7, at 18–21, for a useful introduction to these 
statutes and their historic background; compare HAZEN, supra note 7, at 632–47, and 2 LOUIS 
LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 1608–
25 (7th ed. 2018), for general discussions of the interplay between regulatory conduct-of-business 
standards and fiduciary law in the U.S. 
29     See, in particular, Financial Services Act 1986 c. 60 § 48 (Eng.)(authorizing the promulgation 
of conduct-of-business rules by the FSA); see also id. § 119(1)(a) (regarding the SRO’s powers to 
promulgate separate standards of conduct). 
30     Council Directive 93/22, art. 11, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, 37. 
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of the 1990 IOSCO “Principles,” reflecting not just the latter’s usefulness as a 
technical source of inspiration for legislators world-wide, but also their relevance 
as a driving force for the trend towards global convergence. The requirements 
were later taken up, and refined further, by the successors to the 1993 ISD, name-
ly, the (first) markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) of 200431 and 
the current regime, laid down in Articles 24 and 25 of MiFID II.32  
Against this backdrop, the publication of the first version of the IOSCO 
“Principles,” in 1990s, clearly was not the trigger of global convergence, but 
merely a reflection of a growing convergence that had started some time before. 
For a number of reasons, the significance of the ‘Principles’ goes far beyond a 
mere formal recognition of that trend and helps explain the successful emergence 
of genuinely transnational standards in the field, however:  
First, the origins in an institutionalized cooperation of securities authorities 
clearly distinguishes the “Principles” from other initiatives for the global harmo-
nization of laws, as they do not just reflect the perspective of an impressive range 
of important jurisdictions, but also reflect these jurisdictions’ willingness to coor-
dinate their respective laws and enforcement regimes accordingly. Originating 
from the Inter-American Conference of Securities Commissioners (established in 
1974), IOSCO had been created as a global institution with an impressively broad 
membership base in the mid 1980s.33 By instituting an international “working 
group on Principles of Ethical Conduct”, with members from Hong-Kong, Italy, 
Japan, Quebec, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, as well as 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission of the United States, with Australia as a correspondent member,34 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee had, in fact, brought together authorities from the 
most important financial markets world-wide. While in itself the result of techno-
cratic regulation without participation of democratically elected political actors, 
this background undoubtedly helped enhance the legitimacy of the “Principles” in 
the eyes of legislators of participating jurisdictions, inasmuch as they could be in-
terpreted as reflecting the accumulated expertise of leading authorities in the field 
of securities regulation. In this respect, the IOSCO standards fall in line with the 
development of international standard setting in the area of financial regulation 
more generally (sometimes referred to as “The Global Financial System”), which 
was first associated mainly with the activities of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in the 1970s and was reinforced through various policy initiatives by 
the G-20 nations under the auspices of the newly created Financial Stability Board 
after the global financial crisis.35 To be sure, IOSCO’s influence on global legisla-
tive developments has been limited so far, especially by comparison with the out-
put generated by the Basel Committee and its impact on the convergence of regu-
latory frameworks in the field of prudential banking regulation.36 Although na-
tional interpretations of the standards and enforcement practices continue to dif-
 
31     Directive 2004/39, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Mar-
kets in Financial Instruments Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Di-
rective 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Di-
rective 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 16–18. 
32     See MiFID II, supra note 3. 
33    See, e.g., EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, 
THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS, 173–74 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
34     The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶ 2. 
35     See, for example, CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 70–90 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012), and Helleiner, supra note 15, at 232–49, for a general discussion of 
the different standard setting bodies. See also, ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM 
CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE (2011), for an 
analysis of the crisis-driven history of the relevant institutional arrangements. 
36       Brummer, supra note 35, at 78. 
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fer considerably between individual jurisdictions at a more granular level,37 the 
relevance of IOSCO’s work on conduct-of-business standards is hardly disputa-
ble, precisely because the “Principles” reflected (and reinforced) earlier trends to-
wards global convergence, which were then taken up also in incoming European 
legislation. 
Secondly, and related to the foregoing, the interplay between international 
standards with incoming EU regulation certainly played an important role as a 
driving force towards global convergence. The IOSCO “Principles,” as noted be-
fore, were formative for the development of harmonized conduct-of-business 
standards under the European Investment Services Directive of 199338 and, sub-
sequently, MiFID I and MiFID II,39 reinforcing their importance as a global 
benchmark. At the same time, the representation of European jurisdictions in the 
working group arguably was instrumental in shaping their character as a product 
of genuinely transnational collaboration between legal systems of different ori-
gins. Motivated by the objective to create a common Internal Market for financial 
services among the Member States of the European Economic Community and, 
subsequently, the European Community and the European Union,40 European 
legislation and European institutions thus contributed to, and reinforced, a more 
general trend towards global convergence of financial law and regulation and es-
tablished themselves as an important driving force towards the globalization of 
markets and relevant legal frameworks (and the rise of European financial mar-
kets began to balance out the dominance of US law and regulation as the domi-
nant rule-maker for global transactions). In this respect, the development of 
transnational conduct-of-business standards for the fiduciary relationship between 
financial intermediaries and their customers mirror a broader trend in internation-
al financial regulation, which can be observed particularly clearly in the field of 
banking regulation.41 
Thirdly, by taking the form of an easily accessible, concise, indeed rather 
simple document, the standards certainly were highly conducive to be used for 
application across a wide variety of different jurisdictions. As formulated in the 
IOSCO “Principles,” the conduct-of-business standards do not even purport to 
provide a comprehensive legal framework for the formation and execution of 
contracts between intermediaries and their customers, or, indeed, for specific 
means of enforcement of duties arising thereunder. With a focus on individual 
aspects of the intermediary-customer relationship, they merely establish minimum 
qualitative standards addressing agency problems in general, and conflicts of in-
terests and information asymmetries in particular, between the two parties – 
standards that can (and, indeed, are designed to) be implemented and enforced 
differently in different legal and institutional environments. This approach was 
 
37      Compare, for example, Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Pre-
liminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007), and Mark J. Roe., Public 
and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009), for il-
lustrative trans-Atlantic analyses. 
38      See supra, note 30. 
39      See supra, notes 31 and 32, respectively. 
40      See infra Section III.A, for a discussion of the relevant policy and legal background.  
41     Compare BRUMMER, supra note 35, at 45–48 (discussing the impact of European financial law 
making on global financial governance), with KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN 
EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
OF SYSTEMIC RISK, ch. 4 (2005) (portraying a general analysis of the emergence of global ‘soft law’ 
in financial regulation). 
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clearly motivated by residual differences among IOSCO member states in terms 
of both substantive legal nature and enforcement mechanisms.42 
Importantly, this background reflects a need to redefine what is actually 
meant by “fiduciary law” in a transnational context. Despite obvious parallels and 
similarities between the regulatory standards and traditional concepts of the 
common law of fiduciary relationships,43 transnational conduct-of-business stand-
ards pertaining to the fiduciary relationship between financial intermediaries and 
their customers are generic in the sense that they can, and will, apply irrespective 
of whether or not the legal environment is constituted by common law principles. 
As illustrated by the IOSCO “Principles,” transnational law governing fiduciary 
relationships in the field of financial intermediation, in order to be adaptable 
across different jurisdictions with different systems of private law, inevitably has 
to be defined exclusively by its object and objectives rather than by reference to 
the doctrinal roots of fiduciary law in common law legal systems. The quest, in 
other words, has been for universally acceptable solutions to common problems 
deriving from the status of the relevant parties to contractual relationships (which, 
in a common law environment or in law and economics terminology influenced 
by concepts of common law, can be characterized as “agency” or “fiduciary” rela-
tionships). In order to be adaptable, the relevant standards therefore had to estab-
lish “functional” (as distinct from doctrinal-technical) fiduciary law. By contrast, a 
mere “transplantation” of common law fiduciary law into other legal environ-
ments, i.e., the application of the same set of substantive rules without regard to 
the specific nature of the applicable contract law regime, would inevitably create 
coordination problems between conflicting regimes.44 
B. From fiduciary law to “functional fiduciary law”: the fiduciary roots of conduct-of-business 
regulation (and some implications on the relevance of regulatory fiduciary duties for the 
intermediary-customer relationship) 
If, as discussed before, converging conduct-of-business standards in the 
field of securities intermediation can be interpreted as the establishment of trans-
national fiduciary law in the field of financial intermediation, this finding, as such, 
tells us little about the functions of the relevant rules within the broader legal 
framework that governs the rights and duties of parties to relevant contracts, es-
pecially vis-à-vis the applicable contract law regime. This caveat should not come 
as a surprise: Precisely because the relevant standards address only selected, if 
crucial aspects of the intermediary-customer relationship, and because they do so 
at a rather abstract level, their technical relevance (and doctrinal interpretation) is 
bound to differ depending on the nature and content of the relevant contract law 
environment. 
In order to facilitate the understanding of the core characteristics of trans-
national fiduciary law in the field of financial intermediation in substantive as well 
as in functional terms, however, the analysis clearly cannot stop here. In this con-
text, it is particularly important to note that conduct-of-business regulation for fi-
nancial services has never – and nowhere – been developed or applied inde-
pendently from principles or doctrines of general private law originating outside 
the regulatory sphere. Rather, such standards can be said to have complemented gen-
 
42      Cf. The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶ 25 (“Conduct of business rules are 
implemented by the different member organisations in a variety of ways: laws; regulations; internal 
rules within a company or institution; unwritten principles and customs; case law.”). 
43      See infra Section II.B. 
44      In this regard, the on-going discussion on the legal nature of regulatory conduct-of-business 
rules and their implications on contractual duties of intermediaries in a number of European juris-
dictions can be interpreted as ample evidence. See infra Section III.C. 
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eral principles of contract or, indeed, fiduciary (or agency) law: Both from a his-
toric perspective and in terms of substantive content, they were developed in or-
der to enhance the protection of investors against intermediaries – the beneficiar-
ies of agency relationships in a wider sense, who otherwise could rely only on 
general principles of contract, tort, agency, or, again, fiduciary law.45 Historically, 
the emergence of conduct-of-business standards in US securities regulation cer-
tainly was revolutionary, less in terms of the substantive content (which, in many 
respects, can be traced back to general principles of common law), but rather in 
terms of the transformation of such principles into mandatory requirements, to 
be operationalized in each securities firm’s operations and business practices and 
to be monitored by public authorities ex ante. In other words: It is hardly surpris-
ing that the gradual recognition of duties of care, knowledge, and skill in the ap-
plicable regulatory frameworks, to some extent at least, mirrored pre-existing general 
principles of law, including core principles of the common law of fiduciary duties. 
Nor should it come as a surprise that regulatory rules may come to be interpreted, 
and applied, by recourse to general principles of law (including, again, principles 
of fiduciary law) – and may even influence the interpretation and further devel-
opment of such general principles in law suits ex post. Historically, the interplay 
between regulatory and legal conduct-of-business standards in US law provides 
ample evidence in this regard, where both regulatory agencies (in particular, the 
Securities Exchange Commission) and courts, respectively, have repeatedly (a) re-
inforced existing regulatory norms by adapting fiduciary principles in the course 
of their interpretation in specific circumstances, (b) transformed fiduciary princi-
ples into new regulatory requirements, or (c) "filled the gaps” left by regulatory 
requirements through imposing additional restrictions on intermediaries based on 
general principles of fiduciary law.46 
Against the historic backdrop of conduct-of-business regulation, it is also 
not surprising that the restatement of conduct-of-business requirements in the 
IOSCO principles, with their focus on establishing “functional fiduciary law” (a 
duty of care and skill in the interest of customers and on preventing or, at least, 
mitigating potential conflicts of interests on the part of the intermediary and their 
implications for the customers), bears parallels with the traditional emanations of 
fiduciary principles as developed in common law. To be sure, differences between 
traditional concepts of fiduciary law on the one hand and the individual conduct-
of-business standards certainly exist, and the regulatory standard often deviates 
substantially from generally accepted principles of fiduciary law.47 Nonetheless, 
the parallels are particularly obvious with regard to the fiduciary duty to avoid 
conflicts of interests, the fiduciary’s duty not to exploit his position at the expense 
of the beneficiary, and the duty of loyalty to the beneficiary.48 
 
45      Compare, for a forceful statement to that effect, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963), (noting that “[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . reflects a con-
gressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship . . . 
.”). 
46      See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 868–69 (discussing specific examples). Cf., HAZEN, supra 
note 7, at 632–39; LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 28, at 1608–25. Compare, The Law 
Commission, supra note 2, Part VI, for a useful analysis of the policy choices encountered when 
structuring the interplay between regulatory and private law requirements from an English law 
perspective. 
47       One (important) example is the regulatory requirement to treat customers fairly, which does 
not appear to have origins in English case law. Cf. JOANNA BENJAMIN, FINANCIAL LAW, ¶¶ 27.11, 
27.21-27.25 (2007). 
48       Compare The Law Commission, supra note 2, ¶ 2.4.9, for a useful summary of the core ele-
ments of fiduciary duties in the present context. 
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It follows that regulatory requirements and private law, including fiduciary 
principles, pertaining to the same activities – different types of financial services – 
cannot, and should not, be conceptualized as functionally separate regimes, but 
rather have to be understood as functional complements, designed to work to-
gether to ensure adequate levels of investor protection. Conduct-of-business regu-
lation and parallel principles of private law thus present an illustrative showcase 
for the more general observation that the purposes of modern private law, almost 
inevitably, are not confined to defining the rules for private contracting in full 
freedom (“private autonomy” in a civil law perspective), but usually include (semi-
)regulatory objectives to ensure fairness between unequal parties.49 Fiduciary law, 
with its focus on the protection of “vital interactions of high trust and confidence 
resulting in one party’s implicit dependency upon and peculiar vulnerability to an-
other” by “imposing strict duties requiring fiduciaries to act honestly, selflessly, 
with integrity, and in the best interests of their beneficiaries.”50 
With the recognition and refinement of requirements addressing agency 
problems between intermediaries and their customers, more specifically: structural 
information asymmetries and conflicts of interests inherent in the business model 
of financial intermediaries and the resulting incentives for the expropriation of 
customers by intermediaries, conduct-of-business regulation can be interpreted as 
facilitating additional enforcement and sanctions mechanisms to duties at least 
some of which, in substance, existed previously (in fiduciary law or elsewhere in 
general private law). To be sure, within the EU as well as elsewhere, regulatory 
standards apply in their own right, irrespective of the applicable private law. From 
a purely regulatory perspective, it may therefore appear pointless to discuss their 
private law implications.51 However, given the limitations of norm enforcement 
by public authorities generally (attributable not just to limited resources, but pos-
sibly also to the incentive structures of public officials),52 it is fair to assume that 
the effectiveness of regulatory norms from a customer perspective, to the extent 
that the substance of such norms is not at least replicated by corresponding pri-
vate laws, crucially depends on whether or not private enforcement of the regula-
tory norms is possible in the respective jurisdiction. 
The above analysis should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that regula-
tory requirements, as enforced by public authorities ex ante, and general principles 
of law, as enforced by courts in private law suits ex post, are functionally identical 
sides of the same coin. They are, in fact, not just operationalized in different ways, 
but may also serve partly different objectives.53 Nor should it be forgotten that 
 
49       Compare Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 
(2016), for a recent general discussion. And see Alexander Hellgardt, Regulierung und Privatrecht, in 
216 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 349 (2016), for an impressive analysis of the regulato-
ry functions of private law (in German). 
50       In the words of Rotman, supra note 1, at 986. Accord LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY 
LAW, 250–55 (2005). 
51       See Luca Enriquez & Matteo Gargantini, The Overarching Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the 
Client in MiFID II, in REGULATION OF THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND MIFIR, ch. 
4, ¶ 4.16 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini, eds., 2017) (discussing the nature of EU conduct-of-
business standards). 
52      On the respective advantages and shortcomings of public and private law enforcement, see 
generally, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 
38 J. ECON. LIT. 45 (2000); Polinsky & Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403 (Polinsky & Shavell, eds., 2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 24 (9th ed. 2014). 
53      Note, in this context, that the IOSCO “Principles,” in addition to the protection of inves-
tors, are also designed so as to protect market integrity, which certainly does not form part of in-
termediaries’ duties to customers under general contract or, indeed, fiduciary law. The Technical 
Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, at 9–11. 
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the substantive content of the two regimes may differ and, indeed, conflict.54 At 
the same time, though, it is important to recall that even in the United States, as 
the country of origin of modern conduct-of-business regulation, where relevant 
principles had been developed long before the trend towards global convergence 
of securities laws in the 1980s and 1990s arose, the regulation of the intermediary-
customer relationship has transcended traditional concepts of fiduciary law from 
the very origins of modern securities regulation in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
emergence of what we could describe as “functional fiduciary law”, a set of rules 
and requirements addressing the specific agency problems of the relationship be-
tween intermediaries and investors, thus took place long before the relevant sub-
stantive rules became exported to, and adapted by, foreign jurisdictions in the 
course of the globalization of securities regulation at a later stage. As a conse-
quence, the analysis of fiduciary principles in the area of financial intermediation 
inevitably has to rely on a non-technical, “functional” understanding of fiduciary 
principles – an understanding that is determined by the protective objectives of 
fiduciary law55 rather than by its traditional emanation in common law. 
Similar considerations apply with regard to the resulting tensions between 
regulatory standards and private law – and thus the need to determine whether 
and to what extent the applicable regulatory standards should have a bearing on the 
individually enforceable private law duties arising within intermediary-customer re-
lationship (whether these follow from general contract law or, for that matter, 
other general principles of law, including tort, agency, or indeed fiduciary law in 
the technical sense). 
In light of the foregoing problems of coordination between the two re-
gimes, cases where the respective requirements differ from and, potentially, con-
flict with each other, therefore have to be accepted as inevitable. The need to rec-
oncile regulatory duties – “functional fiduciary law” within the meaning defined 
above – with each jurisdiction’s private law environment therefore has to be con-
sidered as part and parcel of the emerging body of transnational fiduciary law in 
the area of financial services regulation. In a transnational context, defining a so-
lution to these problems of coordination will be particularly difficult precisely be-
cause the operation of “functional fiduciary law” or, at least, its impact on the in-
termediaries’ privately enforceable duties vis-à-vis their customers, is inevitably 
contingent on how each individual jurisdiction will coordinate regulatory duties on 
the one hand and the applicable private law on the other hand. One could charac-
terize this problem as the fundamental “contingency problem” for the develop-
ment of transnational fiduciary law in the field of financial services: the problem 
that a truly transnational understanding of what constitutes fiduciary obligations 
of financial intermediaries towards their customers and how these obligations af-
fect the customers’ position in their individual contractual relationships is contin-
gent on the interplay between regulatory rules and the applicable private law.  
Given the long-standing trend towards international cooperation between 
supervisory authorities and convergence of regulatory standards as well as super-
visory practices in all fields of financial regulation and supervision, there is no rea-
son to doubt that the implementation and supervisory enforcement of regulatory 
conduct-of-business standards, as such, can be accomplished effectively and con-
sistently (and the convergence of applicable standards, developed within the insti-
tutional framework of IOSCO, provides ample evidence in this regard). The 
“contingency problem” identified above, by contrast, is inevitably more difficult 
 
54      See Jackson & Gillis, supra note 6, at 868–69, for a functional analysis of overlaps and ten-
sions between fiduciary law and regulation in the U.S. Compare The Law Commission, supra note 
2, Part VI, for a similar analysis from an English law perspective. 
55       As to which, see, again, supra text accompanying note 49. 
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to resolve – and it clearly presents a rather complex impediment for the develop-
ment of transnational fiduciary law in the field. The case of conduct-of-business 
regulation in the European legislative framework, to be considered in the next 
section of the present Article, illustrates the point. 
III. MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW APPLY TRANSNATIONALLY: 
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL LAW  
A. European financial law and conduct-of-business regulation: a primer 
With far-reaching powers to enact legislation designed to harmonize na-
tional laws or, indeed, to create universal rules for application across no less than 
28 (post-Brexit: 27) jurisdictions with different legal traditions, substantive laws, 
and enforcement institutions, the European Union56 indisputably is an important 
driver towards convergence in all areas of law and regulation covered by the 
mandate (and corresponding powers) laid down in the Treaty on European Union 
(“TEU”) and, in particular, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). It is an open question whether or not (and, if so, to what extent and 
subject to which qualifications) European financial law would qualify as a “trans-
national legal order”. To be sure, EU law generally constitutes a legal order, and a 
highly developed one for that matter, considering the specific constitutionaliza-
tion of the European Union (not quite a federation of states, but certainly more 
than an international organization), the comprehensive perimeter of European 
economic lawmaking as a whole (which covers legislation in all areas of economic 
activity), the existence of European (as distinct from national) regulatory and su-
pervisory agencies, and the corresponding high level of harmonization of national 
laws and regulations.57 Taken together, though, these aspects certainly distinguish 
European financial law from other areas of international cooperation of legisla-
tors, authorities and/or courts in different jurisdictions.58 More specifically, it 
could be argued that, owing to the high level of integration of national jurisdic-
tions the EU Member States, EU lawmaking, even though it formally involves a 
multitude of jurisdictions, is structurally closer to coordination problems within a 
single jurisdiction and thus lacks the characteristics of genuine transnational legal 
ordering. In this context, it is worth noting that, under the European Treaties, 
compliance with, and implementation of, legal rules adopted at the European lev-
el takes place within a pre-defined legal framework, in which Member States are 
bound to give effect to EU legislation, and judiciary powers to resolve any con-
troversy as to its legality and substantive content are allocated to the European 
Court of Justice, whose decisions, again, are binding on the Member States.59 
It is neither possible nor necessary to fully explore the nature of EU fi-
nancial law within the present Article. However, European financial law and the 
relevant institutional arrangements established within the EU may have to be 
qualified for the purposes of transnational law theory, it is certainly true that the 
EU and its institutions have played an important role not just in shaping the 
 
56      The same already applied to its predecessors, namely the European Economic Community 
and the European Community. 
57     Cf. Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 3, at 5 (2015) (defining a transnational legal order as: “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding 
and practice across national jurisdictions”). 
58       Compare id. at 18–21, for a general discussion of what constitutes the relevant “transnational”  
element. 
59       See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, 
July 6, 2016, O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU] (setting out the procedure and status of adjudicat-
ing on “preliminary reference” by national courts); see generally, DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DA-
VIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 166–88 (4th ed. 2019). 
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“transnational financial legal order”60 established at a global level, but also in terms 
of implementing the work promulgated by international standard-setters. In the field 
of securities regulation, as with all areas of financial regulation more generally, 
European legislation has thus been instrumental to turn international “soft law” 
standards promulgated by international standard-setting bodies (such as IOSCO) 
into “hard law,” be it in the form of Directives (which harmonize the national 
laws of the Member States) or of Regulations (which apply directly and universally 
in all Member States).61 Both as an increasingly powerful negotiating party in 
working groups responsible for the development and the reform of regulatory 
standards and in view of its powers to render such standards effective across a 
large and important market, the EU has contributed to the effectiveness and suc-
cess of that legal order, making it a useful object of study for present purposes ir-
respective of whether European law itself qualifies as a transnational legal order in 
its own right or merely as a (partly autonomous) subset of a larger system. 
Moreover, EU legislation in the field of financial services regulation, irre-
spective of the constitutional environment and its embeddedness in an institu-
tional structure defined in the Treaties, arguably is also a showcase for more gen-
eral problems of coordination between different legislators, authorities, and 
courts, problems pertaining to the national “operationalization” of legal rules and 
norms originating at a supranational level. The on-going controversy about the 
need for private law implications of regulatory conduct-of-business standards es-
tablished by EU law62 is a particularly illustrative case in point. These problems, 
which—as noted before—inevitably come with implications for the effectiveness 
of any attempt to apply solutions developed at a supranational level to circum-
stances within a national turf, are likely to be more or less identical with those ob-
servable in the context of transnational legal orders proper.63 Irrespective of the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of EU financial law and regulation (and EU economic 
law-making more generally), an analysis of the conditions for and the functioning 
of the harmonization of conduct-of-business standards for financial intermediar-
ies established in EU law can thus be expected to contribute to our understanding 
of transnational legal orders more generally. Much the same applies with regard to 
the interplay between the different levels of rule-makers and standard-setters, and 
its implications on the interpretation and implementation of both legal rules and 
principles of supranational origin in the national legal environments, respective-
ly.64 
Against this general backdrop, it should be recalled that conduct-of-
business regulation has been a core element of EU financial law ever since the in-
troduction of harmonized principles for the regulation of investment services 
with the Investment Services Directive of 1993. The relevant legal acts—the In-
vestment Services Directive, MiFID I and MiFID II65—were all enacted on the 
basis of Treaty provisions mandating the adoption of directives for the harmoni-
zation of national conditions for market entry by individual providers of goods or 
services or for companies from other EU Member States.66 Significantly, the rele-
 
60         To borrow the term coined by Helleiner, supra note 15, at 238. 
61     On the differences and relevance of Directives and Regulations (as defined by TFEU 
art. 288(2) and (3)); see generally, CHALMERS, DAVIES & MONTI, supra note 59, at 114. 
62         See infra Section III.C. 
63      See generally, Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 57, at 31–55 (discussing general aspects of the 
formation and institutionalization of transnational legal orders). 
64        Cf., id. at 55–63 (discussing various scenarios of how transnational legal orders trigger simi-
lar impacts). 
65        See supra, notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
66      See TFEU, supra note 59, art. 53(1) (“In order to make it easier for persons to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons, the European Parliament and the Council shall . . . is-
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vant provision (just as its predecessors in earlier Treaties)67 is confined to the re-
moval of differences in the conditions for market participation in order to facili-
tate the creation of an integrated “Internal Market” for goods and services, histor-
ically the core policy objective of the European Union (cf. Art. 3(3) TEU), which 
requires a regulatory “level playing field” and, thus, harmonized rules governing 
the provision of financial services across all Member States.68 Just as with other 
aspects of EU financial regulation, the harmonization of conduct-of-business 
standards for investment firms, which (at least initially) accomplished the liberali-
zation of national regulations, served as an instrument to facilitate the mutual ac-
cess of financial intermediaries licensed in one of the Member States to what used 
to be reclusive domestic markets.69 Given that this clearly served the interests of 
the regulated industry, it is fair to note close parallels between the development of 
European financial regulation on the one hand and the driving forces behind the 
emergence of global (“transnational”) conduct-of-business standards identified 
above:70 At both levels, the standards were driven by the desire to provide a mu-
tually acceptable basis for market access and market integration, and at both lev-
els, this motive may have helped to enhance the industry’s readiness to adapt and 
comply. 
While allowing for a comprehensive harmonization of the regulatory 
frameworks (not just) for securities intermediaries, however, this constitutional 
background also accounts for an important limitation to the role of EU legislation 
as a catalyst for convergence in the conditions for the provision of such services 
across the Member States. Since the focus was on the harmonization of condi-
tions for market access, EU financial law has never aimed at a full harmonization 
of all norms of relevance for the contractual relationship between intermediaries 
and customers—an attempt that would not just have been technically difficult 
(given residual differences in the national private laws of the Member States) and 
fraught with political controversies. Arguably, it also would have exceeded the 
scope of the relevant legislative powers, which (at least expressly) do not provide 
for a comprehensive harmonization of general private law (even if confined to in-
dividual areas of particular relevance to the Internal Market).71 
To be sure, as will be explored in the following subsection, significant as-
pects of the European conduct-of-business standards (just as the original IOSCO 
“Principles” of 1990) bear close similarities with traditional concepts of fiduciary 
relationships recognized by common law. Given the restrictions of their legal ba-
 
sue directives for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications and for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed 
person.”). 
67        TFEU art. 53(1) effectively replicates the wording of art. 47(2) of the former Treaty on the 
European Community, which itself was based on art. 57(2) of the Treaty on the European Eco-
nomic Community. 
68        Compare NIAMH MOLONEY, EU SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION 8–
13 (3rd ed. 2014), for a general discussion of the constitutional basis for EU securities regulation. 
69        See id. at 19–22; and see Jens-Hinrich Binder, Vom offenen zum regulierten Markt: Finanzinterme-
diation, EU-Wirtschaftsverfassung und der Individualschutz der Kapitalanbieter, ZEUP – ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 569 (2017), for a detailed analysis of the parallels between EU ban-
king and securities regulation in this regard (in German). 
70        See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
71       See Binder, supra note 69, at 588–89, 592–93, 596–98, for a more in-depth discussion. And 
compare Johannes Köndgen, Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonisation?, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES 
MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 115 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 
1998), for an early assessment of the limitations for (and the rationale of) the harmonization of 
conduct-of-business standards through the Investment Services Directive of 1993. 
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sis in European Treaty law, the relevant provisions, nonetheless, must not be mis-
interpreted as mandating the introduction of fiduciary duties in a technical sense, 
that matter being outside the scope of the relevant instruments and left to the dis-
cretion of the Member States.72 Just as the IOSCO “Principles,” the relevant 
standards therefore can be characterized as “functional fiduciary law” within the 
meaning defined above: While clearly addressing core problems of the principal-
agent relationship between intermediaries and clients and applicable to relation-
ships that would qualify as fiduciary in common law, the interplay between the 
regulatory standards and the applicable private law environment of the Member 
States is, at least, not specified in detail by European law. Whether or not at least 
some form of private law implications still ought to be recognized as a matter of 
European law, remains an open question.73 
B. What has become of the IOSCO “Principles”: conduct-of-business regulation in current 
EU legislation 
While a detailed analysis of the current version of conduct-of-business re-
quirements for investment firms in European law, laid down in Articles 24 and 25 
of MiFID II (as well as in delegated legal instruments adopted by the European 
Commission in connection with these provisions)74 would be outside the scope of 
the present Article,75 the close parallels between the relevant duties and the early 
precedents in the IOSCO “Principles” of 1990 are nonetheless worth noting. Alt-
hough formulated in significantly more complex terms and in far greater detail, 
the relevant provisions take up all aspects of the original principles. As a general 
duty that also seeks to fill the gaps left by more specific requirements,76 Art. 24(1) 
MiFID II first establishes a general duty of investment firms, “when providing 
investment services or, where appropriate, ancillary services to clients, [to] act 
honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of . . . cli-
ents . . . .” Art. 24(2), subpara. (2) MiFID II then requires that investment firms 
[U]nderstand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess 
the compatibility of the financial instruments with the needs of the clients 
to whom it provides investment services, also taking account of the iden-
tified target market of end clients (…), and ensure that financial instru-
ments are offered or recommended only when this is in the interest of the 
client. 
 
72      Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, ¶ 4.16. 
73      On which, see further infra Section III.C.2. 
74     See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of Apr. 25, 2016, supplementing Di-
rective 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational re-
quirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of 
that Directive, 2017 O.J. (L 87) 1 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/593 of Apr. 
7, 2016, supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
with regard to safeguarding of financial instruments and funds belonging to clients, product gov-
ernance obligations and the rules applicable to the provision or reception of fees, commissions or 
any monetary or non-monetary benefits, 2017 O.J. (L 87) 500. Note that the relevant requirements 
are specified further in “Guidelines” promulgated by the European Securities and Markets Au-
thority (ESMA) (see Art. 25(9)-(11) MiFID II, outside the scope of the present Article). 
75    See, for example, Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, and Stefan Grundmann & Philipp 
Hacker, Conflicts of Interest, in REGULATION OF THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND 
MIFIR, ch. 7 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2017), for more extensive analyses of the cur-
rent regime. 
76     See Enriquez & Gargantini, supra note 51, ¶¶ 4.16-.22, for further discussion of the functions 
of the duty within the MiFID II framework. 
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Pursuant to Art. 24(3) MiFID II (specified further and complemented with 
detailed duties to inform and warn of risks in para. (4) of the same provision), 
“[a]ll information, including marketing communications, addressed by the invest-
ment firm to clients or potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading. 
Marketing communications shall be clearly identifiable as such.” Art. 24(5) MiFID 
II then continues to define the format and quality of the required information, 
which has to: 
[B]e provided in a comprehensible form in such a manner that clients or 
potential clients are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of 
the investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that 
is being offered and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an in-
formed basis. Member States may allow that information to be provided 
in a standardised format. 
Art. 24(8) and (9) MiFID II restrict the acceptability of commissions or other 
benefits by investment firms for the marketing and recommendation of financial 
products and thus address an important source of conflicts of interest that could 
impair the quality of investment advice and related services. In a similar vein, Art. 
24(10) MiFID II prohibits incentive structures that could induce staff to offer fi-
nancial products whose acquisition would not be in the client’s best interest. 
Complementing these provisions, Art. 25(1) MiFID II then establishes require-
ments for the qualification of natural persons providing investment advice and re-
lated services, while Art. 25(2)-(4) MIFID II specify the obligations of investment 
firms to explore their clients’ interest prior to the provision of services. 
C. The functions and enforcement of conduct-of-business-regulation in Europe: a German and 
a European perspective 
1. German law 
If the effectiveness of “functional fiduciary law” crucially depends on the 
interplay between regulatory standards and the relevant private law environment,77 
EU financial law certainly is a highly illustrative case in point. Just as in other are-
as of EU legislation, the introduction of harmonized conduct-of-business stand-
ards since 199378 had to be implemented in Member States with different legal 
traditions, different contract laws and, in particular, fundamentally different legal 
regimes governing the relationship between financial intermediaries and their cus-
tomers. Among these, only a small fraction—namely the United Kingdom and 
Ireland—are common law jurisdictions, the remainder being variants of civil law 
legal systems. While it is, for obvious reasons, impossible to develop a full ac-
count of the relevant private law environments in each and every Member State 
within the present Article, it is probably safe to assume that at least in the majority 
of them, the relevant aspects of intermediary-client relationships (general duties of 
care and skill, principles governing conflicts of interests, as well as duties to in-
form and disclose) had already been addressed in the applicable contract law (to 
some extent, as the case may be, complemented by general principles of private 
law).79 Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that the interplay be-
 
77     Supra Section II.A. 
78     On the relevant legal instruments, see supra notes 3 and 30–31 and accompanying text. 
79     For a representative overview, cf. the country reports on selected civil and common law juris-
dictions in A BANK’S DUTY OF CARE, supra note 5, at 61, 85, 109, 135, 167, 201, 249, 285, 329 
(discussing Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, England and Wales, Ireland, and 
the United States of America, in that order). See also Danny Busch, Why MiFID Matters to Private 
Law: The Example of MiFID’s Impact on Asset Managers, 7 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 386 (2012). 
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tween regulatory conduct-of-business standards and private law has been debated 
for some time in response to incoming European legislation, with only few juris-
dictions having developed clear-cut solutions for the reconciliation of regulatory 
and private law regimes.80 
In this context, German law certainly provides ample illustration. Building 
both on general contract law, which does not provide a bespoke regime address-
ing intermediary-client relationships, and on general principles of private law, in-
cluding on misrepresentation prior to or in the course of contractual relation-
ships, German courts, in particular in the aftermath of a landmark decision in 
1993,81 have over time defined a rather complex set of duties of care and skill with 
regard to the provision of investment advice, which includes both prescriptive 
and proscriptive elements. As established in a large body of case law,82 investment 
firms are required (a) to ensure that any advice given has to be commensurate 
with the investor’s profile and risk preference, (b) to explore their clients’ exper-
tise, financial position and risk preference prior to the provision of investment 
advice, (c) to inform their clients of all aspects that are material for their invest-
ment decisions, (d) to explore the characteristics and risk profile of any invest-
ment recommended to clients, and (e) to warn clients if on the basis of the explo-
ration of their individual expertise and risk profile they perceive the client to be 
unaware of specific risks arising in the context of a proposed investment. Even 
though fiduciary law, in the common law interpretation of the concept, does not 
exist in German private law, the parallels between these principles and fiduciary 
duties in the common law understanding are obvious. 
Nonetheless, the functional interplay between these principles and the 
regulatory requirements enacted in order to transpose the incoming European Di-
rectives (first in sections 31-34 and, since 2017, in sections 63-71 of the Wertpa-
pierhandelsgesetz [Securities Trading Act]83) has been debated controversially in 
German legal doctrine ever since the transposition of the Investment Services Di-
rective 1993, while the courts have been reluctant to recognize any implication of 
the regulatory regime for the construction of the contractual relationship between 
intermediaries and their clients.84 In a few judgments prior to the transposition of 
MiFID into the German Securities Trading Act, the Federal Supreme Court did 
acknowledge, albeit somewhat imprecisely, that the regulatory requirements, alt-
hough based in public law, could have a bearing on contractual duties to the ex-
tent that their objective was to protect the clients, but that this would not be suf-
ficient to construe duties of care independent from those established under gen-
eral contract law.85 In a few decisions, the Federal Supreme Court and other 
courts have also referred to provisions of earlier versions of the WpHG as a basis 
 
80     See, for example, Peter O. Mülbert, The Eclipse of Contract Law in the Investment Firm-Client-
Relationship: The Impact of the MiFID on the Law of Contract from a German Perspective, in INVESTOR 
PROTECTION IN EUROPE: CORPORATE LAW MAKING, THE MIFID AND BEYOND 299 (Guido 
Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006), for an early assessment of the relevant problems. 
81      Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 6, 1993, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 126. See Binder, supra note 5, at 75–76. The 
following paragraphs borrow from that publication. 
82        See Binder, supra note 5, at 66–81, for an in-depth account of the relevant private law envi-
ronment, an analysis of the resulting duties of intermediaries, and references to case law. 
83        Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], July 26, 1994, BGBL I at 1749, 
repromulgated Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, as amended June 24, 2017, BGBL. I at 1693. 
84       See generally, Matthias Casper & Christian Altgen, Germany, in LIABILITY OF ASSET MANAG-
ERS ¶¶ 4.37-.41 (Danny Busch & Deborah A. DeMott eds., 2012). 
85        Cf., e.g., Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 19, 2006, XI ZR 56/05, 
170 BGHZ 226 (232); Bundesgerichtschof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 24, 2011, XI ZR 
329/00, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift–Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW–RR] 405 (406) 2002. 
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for a duty to avoid adverse consequences of conflicts of interests for clients.86 The 
practical consequences of this approach, however, remained obscure, and subse-
quent case law did little to clarify. In the academic literature, which is frequently 
cited as persuasive authority by German courts, the controversy continues about 
whether, and to what extent, implications of regulatory conduct-of-business 
standards on the private-law relationships between intermediaries and customers 
ought to be recognized. While a majority of authors support the prevailing opin-
ion, whereby regulatory conduct-of-business standards, qua rooted in public law, 
cannot be considered as authoritative for the determination of obligations arising 
in private law, an increasing number of publications have argued for a reconcilia-
tion of both regimes in recent years.87 
Given residual differences between the two regimes that cannot be ex-
plored in detail within the present Article, this state of affairs is clearly unsatisfac-
tory, and strong arguments have been advanced supporting a further realignment 
between the two regimes. Nonetheless, German law as it currently stands contin-
ues to interpret both regimes as functionally and doctrinally separate.88 German 
courts still hesitate to reconcile their interpretation of the applicable contract (and 
general private) law with the substance of conduct-of-business regulations, to the 
extent these are designed to protect investors. As a result, the “functional fiduci-
ary law” established by the transposition of European law in the German Securi-
ties Trading Act, has not transformed into obligations under German private law 
as yet, although, on occasion, it has had an influence on the interpretation and 
doctrinal analysis of the applicable private law regime. 
2. European law 
Given that similar problems of coordination have arisen in other Europe-
an jurisdictions as well as in Germany and that different national approaches, as 
discussed above, will come with different results not just in terms of the rights of 
individual investors, but also in terms of the effectiveness of the regulatory stand-
ards as such, it is hardly surprising that the implications of the harmonized con-
duct-of-business standards should have become the object of a general discussion 
that transcends the national jurisdictions of the Member States. Significantly, the 
question of whether or not these standards should be interpreted as also influenc-
ing the obligations of intermediaries under national contract (and/or general pri-
vate) laws, has been debated not just as a matter of national doctrine (e.g., in order 
to ensure consistency of obligations and to avoid contradictory sanctions), but al-
so as a matter of EU law. 
At first sight, this may appear to be inconsistent both with the fact that the 
relevant European legislation has never itself prescribed specific sanctions, let 
alone the introduction of fiduciary principles proper in the national laws of the 
Member States, and with the lack of legislative powers for the harmonization of 
general private law in the EU Treaties.89 Yet, while both aspects remain largely 
undisputed, it is obvious that differences in terms of obligations under national 
private law may come with implications for cross-border competition in the In-
ternal Market in at least two respects:90 first, if, and to the extent that national pri-
 
86        Cf., e.g., 170 BGHZ 226 (234). 
87        Cf. Binder, supra note 5, at 72–74 (summarizing the case law and the relevant academic liter-
ature). 
88        See Kuntz, supra note 10, for a recent analysis and forceful arguments supporting conver-
gence between the two regimes. 
89        See The Technical Committee of IOSCO, supra note 17, ¶¶ 25–29; see also supra notes 69 and 
71 and accompanying text. 
90        Compare Danny Busch, The Private Law Effect of MiFID I and MiFID II, in REGULATION OF 
THE EU FINANCIAL MARKETS: MIFID II AND MIFIR, ¶¶ 20.03-.27 (Danny Busch & Guido Fer-
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vate law imposes a stricter standard on financial intermediaries than the standards 
defined in the harmonized regulatory frameworks, intermediaries operating in this 
jurisdiction face higher costs than they would incur in other jurisdictions where 
the applicable private law is more closely realigned with the harmonized regulato-
ry standards. Second, where national private laws are less strict than the regulatory 
regime, the absence of private law enforcement as a sanctions regime comple-
menting oversight and enforcement by supervisory authorities may impair the ef-
fectiveness of the regulatory standards, which in turn may create competitive dis-
advantages for similar activities carried out in other Member States. Either scenar-
io would be problematic in view of the EU’s overarching policy objective to cre-
ate an integrated Internal Market with harmonized “rules of the game.”91 Moreo-
ver, the latter scenario would be inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness, a 
core principle of European law developed in case law by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (ECJ), whereby the duty of Member States to comply with 
European law implies their duty to provide for effective implementation (includ-
ing by sanctions in national law).92 
Interestingly, in spite of these rather obvious consequences, ECJ case law 
has remained vague in this regard. In a prominent case addressing the question 
whether MiFID I required the Member States to provide for individually enforce-
able sanctions for a violation of the know-your-customer requirements stated 
therein, the Court held that, in the absence of specific EU legislation to that end, 
the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, re-
mained entitled to define the sanctions regimes according to their own prefer-
ences,93 which, arguably, includes the freedom to restrict implementation to regula-
tory requirements without direct implications for obligations under general private 
law. With the doctrinal debate on-going, it remains to be seen whether this prin-
ciple will be upheld in future cases, even if it could be established that the lack of 
individually enforceable private law duty, in the circumstances, reduces the effec-
tive implementation of the regulatory standards. 
Whatever the future may bring, both the on-going doctrinal debate on the 
private law implications of regulatory standards and the different approaches in 
place across the EU Member States clearly illustrate that the “transnationaliza-
tion” of fiduciary rules for the relationship between financial intermediaries and 
their customers, despite the high level of global convergence of regulatory con-
duct-of-business standards, is a process which has not yet reached its end. Only 
some jurisdictions thus far have resolved the problems of coordination between 
the two regimes, transforming “functional fiduciary law” into private law obliga-
tions in one way or another. In others, the two regimes continue to operate sepa-
rately, sometimes on the basis of rather vague principles, which creates legal un-
certainty for both intermediaries and their customers. It is at least conceivable that 
future developments, either through changes in the applicable EU legislation or in 
 
rarini eds., 2017), for a more extensive analysis discussing different scenarios that have arisen in 
recent practice. 
91       See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
92     See generally, e.g., TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 418–76 (2d ed. 
2006); Walter van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, 37 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 501 (2000). 
93      Case C-604/11, Genil 48 SL, Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos SL v Bankinter SA, Banco Bil-
bao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX, ¶¶ 57, 58; confirmed in Case C-312/14, Banif 
Plus Bank Zrt. v Márton Lantos and Mártonné Lantos, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX, ¶ 79. See Busch, supra 
note 90, for a critical analysis in the light of Court of Justice of the European Union case law in 
similar scenarios. Cf. Stefan Grundmann, The Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract Law, 9 
EUR. REV. CONT. L. 267 (2013) (supporting a more extensive interpretation of the regulatory re-
quirements). 
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the form of a revision of ECJ case law, could trigger further convergence in this 
respect. For the time being, however, convergence with international trends so far 
has been restricted to the regulatory sphere. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Over many decades, regulatory frameworks for the provision of financial 
services—in particular, vis-à-vis retail customers—have come to complement na-
tional contract laws with conduct-of-business standards designed to establish 
minimum qualitative standards of care, skill, and honesty for the provision of a 
wide range of services to customers. At least parts of this regime mirror and, to 
some extent, replicate duties which have also been recognized as fiduciary duties 
in general private law, particularly because (and to the extent that) the underlying 
contractual relationships qualify as agency relationships in common law. Modern 
conduct-of-business standards, developed in order to facilitate the effective pro-
tection of investors through ex ante supervision and enforcement of qualitative re-
quirements, thus have come to complement and, in part, to supersede, functional-
ly parallel duties that would otherwise be enforceable ex post, within the context of 
individual lawsuits brought by customers against their intermediary. Historically, 
this development can be explained with the desire to balance out deregulatory de-
velopments in US state legislation since the beginning of the 20th century through 
the imposition of harmonized standards in federal securities regulation in the 
1930s. 
This process has been taken up by a global trend towards converging 
regulatory standards since the 1980s, which—both in international standards, in 
particular, the IOSCO “Principles”) and European legislation—has been driven 
by the desire to open up national financial markets and facilitate cross-border 
competition for financial services intermediaries. Though certainly onerous in 
terms of compliance cost, the adaptation and implementation of a growing body 
of transnational conduct-of-business standards thus certainly has served industry 
interests. In this regard, securities regulation clearly is in line with the emergence 
of international standards in other fields of financial regulation—particularly in-
cluding the area of prudential requirements for the establishment and on-going 
operations of banking institutions—and it is reflective of the relevance of “soft 
law” as a driving force behind the development of transnational legal orders more 
generally.94 
With regulatory (as distinct from contract) law as a platform and transmis-
sion mechanism for the emergence of a transnational regime for the regulation of 
fiduciary relationships between intermediaries and customers, the respective pro-
visions have changed their nature. While the understanding of fiduciary duties 
and, indeed, their relevance for the solution of problems in the individual contrac-
tual relationships differ considerably, especially between common and civil law ju-
risdictions, the emerging body of principles and duties can nonetheless be de-
scribed as “functional fiduciary law“, i.e., legal solutions to economic problems 
that arise in agency relationships irrespective of the respective underlying contract 
law frameworks and their links towards more general principles (good faith, duties 
of care, skill, and honesty) in the respective legal systems. In this sense, the emer-
gence of a universally accepted body of conduct-of-business standards certainly 
can be characterized as a successful example for transnational legal transplants. 
 
94     See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING 
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 123–34 (2010). 
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Apart from the incentives of the regulated industry to accept and imple-
ment such standards as a price for unrestricted access to foreign markets, two in-
terrelated aspects in particular appear to have facilitated this development: 
First, regulatory law is, almost by definition, generic in nature and thus less 
contingent on functional interlinkages with general principles of contract law, be 
they rooted in common or statutory civil law. 
Second, precisely because the inclusion of transaction-oriented conduct-of-
business standards originally served to compensate for weaknesses in the protec-
tion of investors under general principles of fiduciary law, the applicable regulato-
ry standards were at the same time more focused on specific aspects of the inter-
mediary-customer relationships—and simpler to administer. Regulatory conduct-
of-business standards apply independently from general principles of contract 
law. At the same time, they are not intended to provide a legal basis addressing all 
aspects of the relevant relationships, but merely add to general contract law by 
imposing certain protective duties and facilitating their ex ante supervision by pub-
lic authorities. This allows the implementation and enforcement of regulatory re-
quirements in a way that is functionally and operationally separate from the appli-
cation of general contract law, which in turn facilitates their “export” to, and ad-
aptation by, jurisdictions with different contract law regimes. 
Against this backdrop, however, problems of coordination between the 
regulatory sphere and the respective contract law environment are inevitable, and 
it is hardly surprising that such problems can be identified as a common concern 
in many jurisdictions, including the Member States of the European Union. Rea-
ligning regulatory standards with the technical content of applicable contract law 
and, indeed, general principles of contract law (including, for that matter, the 
common law of agency and fiduciary duties) continues to be difficult especially in 
cases where the substantive content diverges. In this respect, the on-going discus-
sion on the private law implications of the harmonized body of European con-
duct-of-business regulations is just one illustrative showcase. As long as national 
differences in the treatment, and resolution, of such conflicts continue to exist, 
the process of “transnationalization” of what could be described as “functional 
fiduciary law” clearly remains incomplete—with potentially significant results in 
terms of substantive outcomes. Although the transnational convergence of regu-
latory standards that can be described as “functional” fiduciary law has made 
enormous progress over the past decades, the private law regimes applicable to 
the intermediary-customer relationship continue to differ considerably. With the 
relevance of international “soft law” instruments, transnational cooperation of 
regulatory institutions acting under highly politicized mandates and corresponding 
restrictions, and influenced by strong market forces, the emergence of transna-
tional standards for the regulation of financial intermediation thus reflects an on-
going process of transnational legal ordering but does not represent a mature trans-
national legal order yet. 
